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INTRODUCTION 
This research examines why hate speech towards minority groups, or individuals is 
constitutionally protected, while defamatory speech towards individuals is not protected 
by the First Amendment of the Constitution. There are laws prohibiting racial and sexual 
harassment in an education setting or workplace environment, as well as libel and 
slander laws that punish defamation of someone’s character. Defamation, like hate 
speech, can originate from a place of hate. Why isn't hate speech automatically 
considered unprotected speech under the First Amendment, just like defamation? 
 Not all hateful speech is protected, in Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire (1942), 
"fighting words" were considered unprotected by the First Amendment. The Court said 
fighting words were those, "which by their very utterance inflict injury" and which "are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas." The decision defined the limits of free speech 
when harmful speech could cause a breach of the peace. The Court could have 
extended Chaplinsky to harmful speech across racial, ethnic and religious lines. (Bleich, 
2011, p. 922). Another prominent case recognizing a First Amendment exception for 
speech targeting a race was Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952) where the Supreme Court 
said that group libel statutes were constitutional. The White Circle League of America's 
leader was convicted for passing around literature calling for the rapes, robbery, guns, 
knives, and marijuana of the Negro. Unfortunately, in the immediate aftermath of the 
case little was done in Congress to advance the actions of the Court into a federal 
statute (Bleich, 2011, p. 922).          
 In addition, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes a racially or sexually 
hostile workplace illegal. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 makes a 
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sexually hostile education setting illegal, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act makes a 
racially hostile education environment illegal.  
 In addition, in 2009 Congress passed the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. 
Hate Crimes Prevention Act making it a federal crime to assault or kill a person with a 
clear racial motivation. The law also expanded federal hate crime law to apply to crimes 
motivated by a victim's actual or perceived gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, 
or disability.              
 This paper argues that hate speech is not worthy of protection, just like the 
fighting words of Chaplinsky, the group libel of Beauharnais, the hostile employment 
and educational environment outlawed by the nation’s civil rights laws and the hate 
crimes outlawed by the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr Act. Hate speech 
encompasses no “essential part of the exposition of ideas.” (Chaplinsky) Hate speech 
inflicts harm on those who it is aimed at, and, as the Court says, is “of such slight social 
values as a step to the truth than any benefit that may be derived…is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” (Beauharnais). Hate speech 
serves no intellectual purpose in advancing society.  
Literature Review 
European democracies have been stricter in passing and enforcing hate speech than 
the United States. Some European countries have enacted laws to ban hate speech 
completely, because it causes more harm than good for society and after witnessing 
what hate speech can do during the rise of the Nazi Germany and World War II. But 
American courts have taken a more absolutist approach, believing that if such speech is 
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curtailed it could negatively impact our civil liberties. They protect speech even if it may 
be harmful to a person’s dignity, character, or livelihood.     
Europe:            
 There has been a tradition of freedom of expression and opinion in America. 
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Thomas Paine, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, were 
influenced by European philosophers, like John Stuart Mill and John Milton who 
believed in the cultivation of the intellect unfettered by government would result in 
significant contributions to society. They believed speech was a powerful tool that could 
be used to motivate people to affect change whether it be against an absolutist 
monarchy or a new nation founded on liberal principles of equal speech amongst the 
populace. In John Milton's own writings specifically The Aeropagitica, he discusses why 
the truth will win out against falsehood on the battlefield between good and evil. What 
Milton is saying is that ideas need to be debated by both sides, so that freedom will 
prevail (stlawrenceinstitute.org).   According to John Stuart Mill's own writings in 1859, 
who believed that it was ethical to express oneself even if someone else thought it was 
immoral.  Mill said, "I may disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death 
your right to say it" (Bleich, 2011, p. 917).  However, speech can have limitations and 
Mill also had a 'harm principle', which had guidelines that by law would limit expression 
around permissible speech.        
 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., first expressed the “marketplace of ideas” in 
his dissent in Abrams v. United States (1919).  As part of the freedom of expression 
Holmes, following in the tradition of John Stuart Mill, believed the truth will emerge from 
the competition of ideas in a free and open democracy.         
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 When it comes to racist speech and opinion Europe, particularly Western Europe 
there have been constraints on speech involving racism. Incitement to racial hatred 
along with Holocaust denial laws have been passed in European countries to limit Anti-
Semitic beliefs, but in the United States we have continued to examine the First 
Amendment and the protections it affords to racist speech (Bleich, 2011, p. 918).  
 Of course Europeans didn't magically come to the conclusion that hate speech 
should be made illegal because of the racial, ethnic, and religious divisions it caused. 
There were Anti-Semitic newspapers and books in Germany during the Weimar 
Republic along with the Third Republic France. Some in the British Parliament tried to 
outlaw racist speech in 1936 on the purposed grounds to racial or religious prejudice, 
mostly to combat against Oswald Mosely's British Union of Fascists (Bleich, 2011, p. 
919). The MPs' were against the law, because they believed it would forbid criticism of 
the church and that of Germany and France, which could cause prejudice towards 
Germans and French 'races'. Ultimately, the U.K. Attorney General struck down the 
proposed bill citing neutral, catch-all language banning incitement to disorder was in 
keeping with legal precedent. The language regarding racial and religious incitement 
encompassed narrow wording that was too limiting (Bleich, 2011, p. 919).   
 Even in the early 60s when Conservatives' were in power in the United Kingdom 
they fought against reforms to pass laws against racial incitement despite the fact that 
430,000 citizens signed a petition wanted such action. Well, elections have 
consequences and the 1964 election brought the Labour Party into power and with it 
reforms using the proposed law as a tool for integration for immigrants. Their argument 
was to prevent first and second class development amongst the citizens, which could 
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allow inequality from one group to another and incite feelings of hatred between various 
ethnic and racial groups. The 1965 Race Relations Act, specifically Sec. 6, made it 
illegal to intentionally use threatening, abusive, or insulting language likely to stir up 
hatred against sections of the British public on the grounds of colour, race, or 
ethnic/national origins (Bleich, 2011, p. 919).  Additionally, the 1986 Public Order Act 
extended protection to groups defined by nationality and eased requirements in proving 
transgressions by eliminating the need for intent and likelihood to express in utterance. 
 In England, during the 1960s after the Labour Party became the party in power in 
government, Home Secretary Frank Soskice helped pass a law against racial incitement 
(Bleich, 2011).  Soskice’s reasoning was to help assimilate immigrants into British 
society, by allowing immigrants to feel like first-class instead of second-class citizens 
and alleviate feelings “other” from Christian Englishmen toward racial, ethnic, and 
religious minorities.           
  After debate in the House of Commons with staunch opposition by the 
Conservative Party who were holding up bills and debates in a very similar style to the 
Southern Democrats use of the filibuster during the Civil Rights Era in the United States; 
Parliament passed the 1965 Race Relations Act.  (Section 6) rendered it illegal to 
intentionally use threatening, abusive or insulting language likely to stir up hatred 
against sections of the British public on the grounds of colour, race, or ethnic/national 
origins(Bleich, 2011).  After WWII Germany had enacted laws prohibiting Nazi rhetoric 
and symbols, because they could undermine democracy, as well as using phrases and 
symbols, like “Heil Hitler!”, or flying Nazi flags, especially with swastikas.  Laws passed 
and made it illegal to incite hate, advocate violence, insult, and ridicule or defame 
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minorities in the populace, because of the breach of public peace (Stein, 1986).  
According to Bleich, most European democracies began passing hate speech laws 
targeted at racism and religious intolerance in the 60s and 70s.     
 Anti-Semitism was rampant in Germany and France prior to WWII.  Anti-Semitic 
books and stories in newspapers did not hide their feelings of prejudice towards a 
religious minority.              
 In Germany, Parliament unanimously passed a law citing hate speech and racist 
rhetoric only served to undermine the democratic order in 1960.  Expression of racism 
was not tolerated and the government banned Nazi rhetoric and symbols including, 
flags, swastikas, the 'Heil Hitler!' salute, and prohibited National Socialist propaganda 
(Bleich, 2011, p. 920). The German government unanimously voted to reform Article 
130 of their criminal code making it illegal to incite hatred, provoke violence, insult, and 
ridicule, or defame in a manner apt to breach the public peace.     
 In Germany and Austria if anyone walks down the street goose stepping, raising 
their arm to salute Hitler, or anything that could be perceived as racist that harkens back 
to that dark time in Europe one could be arrested on the spot whether or not your 
actions were intentional, or if you were “just joking” and were intoxicated.  Austria and 
other European countries have passed laws forbidding Holocaust denial, downplay the 
damage it created, or make excuses to why it even happened (Bleich, 2011, p. 917).  
This is a controversial step that some see as a limit on free expression.  In 2006 British 
historian David Irving was convicted for stating there were no gas chambers at 
Auschwitz, and Hitler had tried to protect Jews not murder them, and that Kristallnacht 
(Night of Broken Glass, against Jews throughout Nazi Germany and Austria on 9–10 
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November 1938, carried out by SA paramilitary and non-Jewish civilians) was carried 
out by agitators dressed as Nazis instead of by the Nazi party.    
 France only passed anti-racism laws in 1972, there had been efforts and political 
pressure for years, but prominent politicians argued that legislation regarding racial 
incitement was unnecessary.  Fortunately, Jean Foyer, Chairman of the National 
Assembly Law Committee realized racist-inspired acts occurred and there should be 
specific punishments against it (Bleich, 2011, p. 920).   
U.S. Cases:     
The U.S. has protected people’s rights to utter hate speech with the protection of 
the First Amendment.  When particular speech has zero value in the education or worth 
of our society does it truly deserve a place amongst civilized human beings who may be 
disgusted by public displays of language and symbols that could defame, or injure a 
person?  What value does it have for democracy?       
 "Fighting words" those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite 
an immediate breach of the peace was the defining moment in Chaplinsky v.  New 
Hampshire (1942). Walter Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, was passing out pamphlets 
on a public sidewalk and called organized religion a "racket." People gathered around 
which caused a public disturbance, and a police officer, who already warned Chaplinsky 
to keep the noise down approached Chaplinsky again, which resulted in Chaplinsky 
verbally assaulting the police officer calling him a "God-damned racketeer" and "a 
damned fascist" in a public place. He was arrested and convicted under a state law for 
violating a breach of the peace (Chaplinsky). The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
Chaplinsky violated the state statute, which prevents intentional offensive speech being 
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directed at people in a public place. Chaplinsky believed the statute violated his First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech, but Justice Frank Murphy, writing the 
opinion of the Court said, “well-defined and narrowly limited” categories of speech fall 
outside the bounds of constitutional protection.        
 Thus, “the lewd and obscene, the profane, the slanderous,” and (in this case) 
insulting or “fighting” words neither contributed to the expression of ideas nor possessed 
any “social value” in the search for truth (Chaplinsky). The Court ultimately found that 
free speech is not absolute under all circumstances. There can be cases when speech 
is narrowly defined and the New Hampshire statute was found to be narrowly tailored to 
punish specific conduct, in this case "fighting words", so the Court held that the statute 
was not unconstitutional towards the right of free speech, therefore, this is content 
based restriction applied in a narrow circumstance.       
 The landmark group-libel case Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952), punished 
statements aimed at racial and religious groups that would expose 'the citizen of any 
race, colour, creed or religion to contempt, derision or obloquy or which is productive of 
breach of the peace or riots' (Bleich, 2011, p. 922).  Joseph Beauharnais was president 
of the White Circle League, Inc. and he was arrested for passing out leaflets asking the 
mayor and city of Chicago "to halt the further encroachment, harassment and invasion 
of white people…by the Negro.”  Beauharnais was found guilty of violating an Illinois 
statute making it illegal to distribute any publication that "exposes the citizens of any 
race, color, creed, or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy.”  Justice Frankfurter 
authored the opinion of the Court, which concluded that his speech consisted of libel 
and beyond constitutional protection.        
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 In Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), Brandenburg was the KKK leader who made a 
speech at a KKK rally calling for the use of violence to achieve political reform.  
Brandenburg was convicted of violating an Ohio criminal syndicalism law, which made 
advocating the use of violence, sabotage, and terrorism tactics for achieving political 
reform unlawful, and assembling "with any society, group, or assemblage of persons 
formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.”  In a per curiam 
opinion, the Court ruled that Brandenburg's free speech was violated, but also said 
speech can be prohibited if it "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action," 
and it is "likely to incite or produce such action."  The Ohio statute was found to be 
overly broad, because the law was not clear if teaching and advocacy of doctrines 
would actually incite imminent lawless action, thus making the statute unconstitutional.  
 In Collin v. Smith (1978), a case involving members of the American Nazi Party 
wanted to march in a parade in Skokie, ILL, a suburban city of Chicago where there is a 
considerable Jewish population with some Holocaust survivors.  The group wished to 
express themselves by proclaiming white supremacy and anti-Semitism, but the city 
council blocked the Nazis from marching with ordinances, however; the Nazis sued in 
federal court citing content-based regulations.        
 In the opinion of the Seventh Circuit Court, Judge Pell stated, “that the 
fundamental proposition that if these civil rights are to remain vital for all, they must 
protect not only those society deems acceptable, but also those whose ideas it quite 
justifiably rejects and despises” (Collin).  Judge Sprecher who dissented in part and 
concurred in part, addressed the complex issue of members of the Jewish community 
feeling they were being inundated with fighting words, group libel, and hostile audience 
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if the march occurred.  Sprecher believed that there might be need for the government 
to balance these situations regardless of a prior restraint on the demonstration by the 
Nazis to have empathy with groups of people that have experienced historical attitudes 
of hate.              
 In Texas v. Johnson (1989), Greg Johnson was burned the American flag outside 
city hall in Dallas as a means of protest against the Reagan administration.  Johnson 
was convicted under a Texas statute, which outlawed flag desecration and he was 
sentenced to a year in jail and fined $2,000.  In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that 
Johnson’s flag burning was protected as expression under the First Amendment.  His 
conduct was found to be political in nature, and if an audience found the expression of 
his ideas offensive, the state cannot justify their statute prohibiting speech.  Justice 
William Brennan wrote for the majority, “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the 
First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea 
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable” (Johnson).  The 
Court rejected the argument that (Brandenburg) should be applied here, because there 
was no “breach of the peace,” or “imminent lawless action” in Johnson’s flag burning 
and Texas already had statutes that violated “breaches of the peace” directly.   
  In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court heard a case 
involving a St. Paul ordinance punishing the placement of certain symbols that were 
"likely to arouse anger, alarm, or resentment on the basis of race, religion, or gender.”  
One teen had violated the ordinance by burning a cross on an African-American family’s 
yard.  The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, reversed (R. A. V.'s) conviction on the 
ground that the ordinance unconstitutionally criminalized some hurtful expression 
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(specifically that aimed at racial and religious minorities) and no other hurtful expression 
(that aimed at other unprotected groups) based on the political preferences of 
legislators.  Scalia makes clear that "fighting words" is not, as Chaplinsky had 
suggested, a category of speech that is wholly outside of First Amendment protection 
Scalia’s reasoning is based on how a reasonable person would feel about the burning of 
a cross, and not how a more sensitive person would feel.       
 However, the next year in Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993), a Wisconsin statute 
imposed stiffer sentences for racially-motivated assaults than for other types of 
assaults.  Mitchell, a young black man started a fight with a young white man, and the 
Kenosha County court ruled the increase in fines were justified because he selected his 
victim because of his race.  Mitchell argued that the statute violated his First 
Amendment rights. The U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, reasoned that the 
statute did not violate the First Amendment because it paralleled antidiscrimination laws 
that comply with the First Amendment.  The statute was aimed primarily at regulating 
conduct, not speech.           
 In Virginia v Black (2003), the Court was divided on the question of whether a 
state could prohibit cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate.  They 
concluded in a plurality decision that, because cross-burning has a history as a 
"particularly virulent form of intimidation," Virginia could prohibit that form of expression 
while not prohibiting other types of intimidating expression.  The Court found the cross-
burning statute to fall within one of R. A. V.'s exceptions to the general rule that content-
based prohibitions on speech violate the First Amendment.  The Court seems to find 
issues back and forth regarding content versus conduct, versus context when dealing 
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with issues of hate speech (both spoken and symbolic) on a case-to-case basis 
(Virginia).             
 However, the Court believed that the family in (Virginia), was actually threatened 
because the three individuals violated the Virginia statute making it a felony "for any 
person..., with the intent of intimidating any person or group..., to burn...a cross on the 
property of another, a highway or other public place," and specifies that "any such 
burning...shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group," 
(Virginia).          
 Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in his dissent that cross burning should be a First 
Amendment exception, as others have argued regarding flag burning (Johnson).  The 
statute, "prohibits only conduct, not expression. And, just as one cannot burn down 
someone's house to make a political point and then seek refuge in the First 
Amendment, those who hate cannot terrorize and intimidate to make their point" 
(Virginia).  Thomas is saying that cross-burning is a different act of a hate crime, and 
the special nature of conduct of cross-burning is analogous to Nazi swastikas, flags, 
symbols and rhetoric in Europe.  Justice David Souter wrote that cross-burning, even 
with intent to intimidate, should not be a crime under the precedent set in R.A.V.   
 In Snyder v Phelps (2011), the Supreme Court overturned a jury verdict against a 
Kansas-based anti-gay church group that picketed the funeral of a marine who died on 
duty in Iraq.  (The group believes that soldiers' deaths are a form of punishment against 
America for tolerating homosexuality).  A Maryland jury had found that the picketing and 
Internet postings by the group targeted the soldier's parents and constituted intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  Chief Justice Roberts noted that the Westboro Baptist 
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Church group's speech generally related to a matter of public concern, that the group 
complied with all city ordinances and police department requests, and that the funeral 
itself was not disrupted.  However; Justice Alito dissented, arguing that at least some of 
the group's speech directly attacked the Snyder family and therefore did not relate to a 
matter of public concern. "Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is 
not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case” (Phelps).   
Statutes punishing hate crimes:        
 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows federal prosecution of anyone who "willingly 
injures, intimidates or interferes with another person, or attempts to do so, by force 
because of the other person's race, color, religion or national origin."  Persons violating 
this law face a fine or imprisonment of up to one year, or both. If bodily injury results or if 
such acts of intimidation involve the use of firearms, explosives or fire, individuals can 
receive prison terms of up to 10 years, while crimes involving kidnapping, sexual 
assault, or murder can be punishable by life in prison or the death penalty (18 U.S.C. 
Section 245).            
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, prohibits discrimination by covered employers on 
the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin,  it also applies to an individual 
associating with another individual from one of the above groups (CRA, 1964).  Title VI 
declares that programs and activities receiving Federal financial assistance may not 
discriminate on the grounds of race, color, or national origin.  Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, prohibited discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving federal financial assistance.          
 The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act 
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expanded the 1969 federal hate crime law, which criminalized actions against 
individuals because of their race, color, gender, or national origin (18 U.S.C. Section 
245 (B)(2)). The Shepard-Byrd statute included crimes motivated by a victim's actual or 
perceived gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability.  Shepard was a gay 
student who was tortured and murdered for his sexuality, and Byrd was an African-
American man who was dragged behind a truck, which resulted in his decapitation, both 
crimes occurred in 1998.  The statute removes the prerequisite that the victim be 
engaging in a federally protected activity, like voting or going to school; gives federal 
authorities greater ability to engage in hate crimes investigations that local authorities 
choose not to pursue; provides $5 million per year in funding for fiscal years 2010 
through 2012 to help state and local agencies pay for investigating and prosecuting hate 
crimes; requires the FBI to track statistics on hate crimes based on gender and gender 
identity (statistics for the other groups were already tracked) (Trout, 2015, p. 13).  
 The recent Oklahoma fraternity case, where two students were expelled for 
singing a virulently racist song on a fraternity bus, involves a clash between free speech 
and the obligation of universities to ensure under the federal civil rights laws that they 
are acting affirmatively create an educational environment free of racial hostility.  
Feldman argues that public universities are organs of the state and are akin to 
government, and universities are meant to be communities of learning that require 
decorum and are more restrictive than the public square.  Insults, screaming, and 
denouncing someone may be protected by the First Amendment, but said speech 
doesn't belong in a classroom (Bloombergview.com).  The fraternity can be banned for 
discrimination, which is conduct, but speaking in favor of discrimination is protected 
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speech.  However, David Boren, President of the University of Oklahoma, said he 
expelled the students for their “leadership role in leading a racist and exclusionary 
chant, which has created a hostile educational environment for others.”  This goes back 
to Civil Rights laws, especially Title VI, which prohibits a racially hostile education 
environment.           
 Mr. Boren has said the students were expelled because their speech was a form 
of discriminatory conduct that created a hostile educational environment for African-
American students.  Having pledges repeat a chant not admitting an African-American 
is racial discrimination and by expelling the two chant leaders from campus fulfills the 
educational goal of maintaining a non-hostile education environment 
(Bloombergview.com).  If in the workplace co-workers said blacks were unqualified for 
the job it would be considered discriminatory speech under Title VII, however, in public 
the speech would be protected as opinion, but at work it is discriminatory conduct in the 
form of speech.            
 The law doesn’t ban speech; it bans the act of discriminating. And when laws are 
aimed at conduct that incidentally burdens speech, the courts don’t subject them to the 
same strict scrutiny they apply to laws directed primarily at speech 
(Bloombergview.com).  The school is performing their legal obligation to provide a non-
hostile educational environment by prohibiting racially hostile conduct.    
 Many First Amendment scholars argued, however that the president of the 
university violated the students’ free speech rights by expelling them.  Hate speech is 
protected by the First Amendment so a state university cannot expel a student for 
hateful expression, especially when it is off-campus.  (Volokh)   
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Opposition to Hate Crime Statutes:         
 Some people question why have hate crime laws all when hate crime involves a 
separate crime punishable by existing law?  Justifications for enforcing hate crimes 
separately is because the motivation of hatred, bias, or prejudice, the moral culpability 
of the wrongdoer is greater than that of a person who commits a crime without that 
motivation. Therefore the punishment ought to be proportionally greater (Trout, 2015, 
p.131).  Hate crimes target a community and not just a single individual, when someone 
is attacked because of particular characteristics it sends fear inside that members of 
that particular community.  Moreover, existing criminal statutes have been ineffective at 
deterring hate crimes perpetrators, so additional deterrence is needed (Trout, 2015, 
p.131).             
 The opponents of hate crime statutes claim that existing laws are good enough to 
combat crime; they claim that hate crime laws give more protection to certain groups of 
people that everyone cannot enjoy equally; they contend that hate crime laws are 
inefficacious, perhaps even counter-productive by provoking retaliation against 
protected groups, and opponents often raise First Amendment constitutional challenges 
to hate crime laws, arguing that valid speech against certain groups is suppressed or 
chilled by hate crime legislation (Trout, 2015, p. 131).      
 Hate crime statutes raise a complicated set of First Amendment concerns, and 
potentially rely on impermissible content-based distinctions.  However, Shepard-Byrd 
avoids these complications, because it does not extend to threats, and all First 
Amendment challenges have so far been unsuccessful (Trout, 2015, p. 131).   
 A group of pastors sued in an attempt to enjoin enforcement of the Shepard-Byrd 
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Act over the First Amendment.  The Sixth Circuit upheld the District Court's dismissal for 
the pastors' lack of standing citing that the plaintiffs haven't shown an intent to violate 
the Act, or prove to have shown sufficient evidence they would be subjected to adverse 
law enforcement action.  Since the case was resolved on standing grounds it shows that 
First Amendment concerns were overblown and that limiting the Act to bodily injury 
precludes any valid First Amendment problems (Trout, 2015, p. 131).    
 James Dobson, founder of Focus on the Family, a socially conservative group, 
opposed the Shepard-Byrd law saying it would "muzzle people of faith who dare to 
express their moral and biblical concerns about homosexuality" (nytimes.com).  In the 
House version of the bill, H.R. 1592, there is a rule called the "Rule of Construction", 
which specifically provides that "Nothing in this Act...shall be construed to prohibit any 
expressive conduct protected from legal prohibition by, or any activities protected by the 
free speech or free exercise clauses of the First Amendment (H.R. 1592).    
 Brian Walsh, senior legal fellow at The Heritage Foundation, writes that the 
HCPA (Hate Crimes Prevention Act or 2009, or Shepard-Byrd Act) would federalize 
violent, non-economic conduct that is truly local in nature and have little or no federal 
nexus (theheritagefoundation.com).  He claims Congress lacks the constitutional power 
to create the HCPA, and state law enforcement would be hindered by the statute.  He 
makes clear that racially motivated violence is repugnant, but the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides equal protection under the law and there is no evidence that 
states don't enforce civil and criminal laws unevenly.  Also, he mentions that 45 of the 
50 states have passed "hate crimes" statutes responding to violence and intimidation 
based on bias.            
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 Walsh continues to say that the HCPA is to broad regarding "hate crimes" and 
doesn't require the government to prove that the accused was motivated by bias, 
prejudice, or hatred.  44 of the 45 states already have stringent penalties on violent acts 
related to race, religion, or ethnicity, and 31 states do so for violence toward individuals 
regarding sexual orientation (theheritagefoundation.com).  Walsh further argues that the 
Constitution doesn't grant Congress or the federal government general police power, 
therefore, Congress doesn't have the power to criminalize the majority of violent, non-
economic activity inside the principal criminal offenses in the Act.  Congress's 
Commerce Clause power is an insufficient argument.  The HCPA applies to anyone 
who, "willfully causes bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, or 
an explosive or incendiary device, attempts to cause bodily injury to any person.”  This 
violent, non-economic activity does not involve interstate commerce 
(theheritagefoundation.com).           
 All crime is punishable by the government of every state, regardless of the 
motivation of the accuser or the victim's identity.  Almost all states have adopted some 
kind of "hate crime" statute, which under the Constitution doesn't exceed their (the 
states’) authority to criminalize violent, non-economic activity that remains local in 
nature.              
Yong vs. Taylor:          
 Caleb Yong and Robert S. Taylor, have different views and approaches about 
how hate speech should be regulated, if at all.  Yong favors specific categories of hate 
speech that can and should be regulated by government, while other types of hate 
speech are protected.  Taylor is more concerned about civil libertarian protections on 
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speech is best for democracy except for very narrow circumstances. Taylor believes 
that the priority of liberty is paramount and hate speech as Yong has defined it is 
against the priority of liberty and civil libertarian values.  Only very narrowly defined 
terms of hate speech such as “face-to-face vilification” by means of “fighting words” or 
as “hostile-environment harassment” (Taylor, 2012, p. 354) should be restricted.   
 Yong dismisses 'nihilist' positions on free speech and believes in a principle 
based in political morality, what he calls the Free Speech Principle (FSP), based on a 
liberal conception of justice.  Yong differs from Taylor on what Taylor calls ‘group libel.’  
According to Yong, ‘group libel’ is unprotected speech under what he calls the Free 
Speech Principle (FSP), because it designates false assertions that hold up to ridicule 
or contempt, or bring into disrepute, a racial or religious group (Yong, 2011, p. 401-402).  
Given the highly controversial and evaluative nature of the question of how a group 
should be characterized (Yong, 2011, p. 402).  Taylor defines hate speech as a type of 
group libel: speech (oral or written) that argues for the mental, physical, and/or ethical 
inferiority as undermining fair equality of opportunity for  members of particular 
historically-oppressed groups (e.g., blacks, women, Jews, and homosexuals) (Taylor, 
2012, p. 353-354).          
 Yong believes that the term hate speech is a broad designation to usefully 
analyze a single category that includes different kinds of speech acts that involve 
different kinds of free speech interests and can cause very different kinds of harm 
(Yong, 2011, p. 385).  Therefore, he classified four different categories of what 
constitutes hate speech: (1) targeted vilification, (2) diffuse vilification, (3) organized 
political advocacy for exclusionary and/or eliminationist policies, and (4) other 
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assertions of fact or value, which constitute an adverse judgment on an identifiable 
racial or religious group (Yong, 2011, p. 386).  Yong believes the FSP to be a distinct 
principle, which goes beyond a general principle of negative liberty such as that 
defended by Mill (Yong, 2011, p. 387).   
Yong argues that speech unprotected by the First Amendment is regulable.  
Regulable speech can be regulated or restricted through legal and institutional means 
without violating the First Amendment, or Yong’s FSP (Yong, 2011, p. 388).  Even 
though some forms of hate speech is regulable and should be restricted, Yong is 
concerned that government legislation restricting hate speech could give authority 
figures over-breadth in their powers when regulating speech (Yong, 2011, p. 389).  He 
cites crimes like perjury, bribery, insider trading, solicitations to commit crimes are is 
unprotected speech by the First Amendment, and it is simple to show harm towards 
society.  Institutions such as law enforcement and the courts can regulate such speech 
when needed.             
   Targeted vilification is unprotected speech and uncovered by the FSP, diffuse 
vilification and organized political advocacy for exclusionary and eliminationist policies is 
unprotected speech, and that other assertions of fact and value, including so-called 
group libel, are protected hate speech (Yong, 2011, p. 402).     
  Yong does not place special weight on the difference between speech and 
conduct.  He believes hate speech covered by the FSP garners greater protection from 
legal restrictions (Yong, 2011, p. 387).  Nevertheless, he argues that some hate speech, 
consistently with the FSP, cannot be restricted or regulated.  Hate speech is 
unprotected when there are clear, compelling interests that cause serious harm to the 
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intended hearer, or society even if the speech advances some of the interests and 
values covered in the FSP (Yong, 2011, p 388).  Defamatory speech should restricted, 
because it is intended to be intentionally harmful.  He finds that some forms of hate 
speech is regulable, however, he is concerned that government legislation restricting 
hate speech could give authority figures over-breadth in their powers when regulating 
speech.(Yong, 2011, p. 389).           
 Targeted vilification is uncovered by the FSP and unprotected speech, because it 
does not promote any free speech interests and its regulation would not violate any free 
speech rights.  According to the FSP, this form of hate speech is regulable (Yong, 2011, 
p.396).           
 Diffuse vilification differs from targeted vilification inasmuch as it is not directed at 
specific individuals or small groups, but is directed either (partly) to a sympathetic public 
audience, or at a wide and indeterminate audience (Yong, 2011, p. 396).  Most often 
this is expressed as symbolic speech, and one example we had covered earlier in this 
paper, Collin v. Smith (1978).  The speech may be used to wound, insult and intimidate 
people of a certain group, but said group may not be the intended audience but just 
bystanders.  A Nazi march is political speech at some level, and regulating diffuse 
vilification could violate the speaker or audience right to autonomy (Yong, 2011, p. 397).  
Diffuse vilification cannot be regulated and is considered covered, protected speech 
under Yong’s FSP, because the speech doesn’t cause harm when attempting to recruit 
supporters to discriminatory points of view.  Yet, it acts through a direct intervention in 
the public domain sending public signals to targets, but when the law tries to control this 
harm it operates simply by attempting to disable the ability to send such public signals; it 
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does not attempt to influence the ways in which agents are able to propagate or access 
certain views (Yong, 2011, p. 398).           
 Organized Political Advocacy for Exclusionary and Eliminationist policies are 
covered as political speech, but also unprotected which makes it regulable.  
Exclusionary policies exclude racial and religious groups from full and equal citizenship 
by stripping them of their civil and political rights.  Eliminationist policies are used to 
remove racial or religious groups from the population through forced repatriation or 
ethnic cleansing (Yong, 2011, p. 398).  Governments could be convinced by the people 
or vice-versa to enact such policies that would be extremely harmful.  These situations 
have happened before with Nazi Germany, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Kosovo, and more 
recently Sudan (Darfur). The argument from truth discovery seems to me to be 
inapplicable here: the FSP, I take it, is important only within a larger commitment to 
liberal justice, and such a commitment will discount the possibility that claims which 
support the violation of foundational principles of liberal justice are true (Yong, 2011, p. 
398).             
 Participation in democratic self-government strongly protects political speech, but 
this category of hate speech offers no clear grounds for protection in an open 
democracy, however, regulation of this type of hate speech is legitimate for regulation.  
Political equality is crucial to the FSP and political advocacy and organization could 
result in electing an anti-democratic government.  How can one value democracy even 
if it means some elected may call for burning down the government and may advocate 
exclusionary and eliminationist polices.  One way to fight against this form of hate 
speech could be ‘more speech’, that is arguments within a free discussion against the 
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advocated policies (Yong, 2011, p. 400).  Even though Yong has suggested restrictions, 
on this category of hate speech doesn’t violate unjustly free speech rights and that it is 
covered as political speech.  He asserts it is unprotected by the FSP, which makes it 
regulable.  His position is silent on whether it should be regulated, because who would 
decide what speech counts as falling inside this category (Yong, 2011, p. 401).  Yong 
makes this assertion based on the notion that no government could effectively make 
such a judgment of how this category of hate speech would be adopted, because it 
could change from one administration to the next and could lead to abuse.  Regardless 
of his position on this category of hate speech, it is clear that it violates the FSP and 
therefore is regulable.           
 Assertions of fact and evaluative opinions are widely protected speech, because 
they cover arguments from truth, discovery, and democracy.  Evaluative opinions 
involve all free speech justifications even if attacks on specific racial or religious occur 
(Yong, 2011, p. 401).  He does not discount that assertions of fact and evaluative 
opinions cannot produce harm, but defends this category of speech as protected 
because of the powerful free speech interests and rights involved, and the relative 
effectiveness of the remedy of ‘more speech’ in these cases (Yong, 2011, p. 401).  This 
category of speech has cognitive content and can be answered through deliberative and 
articulate speech.            
 Taylor defines hate speech as a type of group libel: speech (oral or written) that 
argues for the mental, physical, and/or ethical inferiority as undermining fair equality of 
opportunity for  members of particular historically-oppressed groups (e.g., blacks, 
women, Jews, and homosexuals) (Taylor, 2012, p. 353-354).  Taylor questions if 
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government restrictions on hate speech are consistent with liberty, and that the priority 
of liberty seems to forbid hate speech restriction (Taylor, 2012, pp. 353-354).  He 
describes liberal egalitarians following Rawls, is committed to basic liberties, but has 
conflictions with their belief in socio-economic equality and a strong commitment to 
freedom of speech (Taylor, 2012, p.353).      
 Taylor distinguishes between speech "regulation" and "restriction."  He uses the 
example of "time, place, and manner" rules as a qualifier of regulations on speech.  
Time, place, and manner rules make communication mutually consistent and protect the 
"central range of application" of free speech.  Taylor states that restrictions on speech 
that would limit scientific or political doctrines would be prohibited, because the content 
is the target, which threatens liberal values related to open expression (Taylor, 2012, p. 
354).              
 Taylor points out that very narrow limitations on speech content based on 
"fighting words," such as racial epithets used in confrontations could be regulated, so 
long as they do not threaten the free exercise of public reason and may protect the 
central range of application of other basic liberties.  The limitations on hate speech 
which Taylor describes are prima facie restrictions, because they are at the heart of 
such free exercise, which depends on open access to all arguments regarding scientific 
and political matters (Taylor, 2012, p. 354).         
 Taylor tries to find the balance if any, for freedom of speech for both liberty of 
conscience and freedom of thought.  He discusses how Mill, Rawls, and Thomas 
Scanlon have adopted "extremism in defense of liberty" in regards to free speech 
(Taylor, 2012, p. 355). Taylor holds that Mill, Rawls, and Scanlon would favor protecting 
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hate speech because of the civil libertarian aspect of their philosophies.  Taylor 
assumes that liberals of all stripes are or should be civil libertarians with respect to 
speech, including hate speech.  Taylor makes clear in his writing that he wishes to 
remain agnostic about hate speech as he has defined it.  He stands by his assertion 
about "fighting words" (racial epithets) being regulated, because their limitation does not 
threaten free exercise of public reason, but he wants a balance with other central 
liberties, such as bodily security (Taylor, 2012, p. 355).     
 Taylor has his own set of principles when balancing free speech rights with what 
he calls the "priority of liberty."  The priority of the equal-liberty (EL) principle over other 
principles of justice (e.g., the fair-equality-of-opportunity [FEO] principle or difference 
principle [DP]) and over other concerns as well (e.g., welfare, efficiency, perfection, 
piety, etc...), (Taylor, 2012, p. 354).  Taylor contends that fairness is a quality of liberal 
theories, and most contemporary liberals (classical liberals and liberal egalitarians) have 
a civil libertarian viewpoint.  He mentions that Rawls also supports the notion that some 
basic liberties may be "less essential" than others, and political liberties and the rights of 
fair equality of opportunity might be "less compelling" than that for “liberty of conscience 
and the rights defining the integrity of the person” (Taylor, 2012, p. 354-355).   
 Taylor illustrates that Mill, Rawls, and Scanlon would favor protecting hate 
speech because of the civil libertarian aspect of their philosophies.  Let's assume a law 
is proposed to punish (through fines) advocating racial and sexually bigoted doctrines 
only on the grounds that said speech would hinder implementation of FEO, especially in 
the structures of college-admission committees and employers.  Concerns over hate 
speech could contribute to socioeconomic inequality can be found throughout 
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philosophical and legal literature and case law (Taylor, 2012, p. 355-356).    
 The cause and effect is clear; speakers advocate bigoted doctrines and those the 
audience either complies (consciously or subconsciously) against historically-oppressed 
groups damaging the FEO principle (Taylor, 2012, p. 359).  The priority of liberty is 
violated by restricting hate speech, however, FEO is realized, and therefore, there is a 
trade-off between EL and FEO.  Nonideal Theory permits tradeoffs between basic 
liberties and opportunities/income if they promote “everyone’s interests” (Taylor, 2012, 
p. 358).  When hate speech is uttered it is usually done so in historically embedded 
structures of social oppression by an aggressor that has deep social and psychological 
structures of domination and subordination.  Because for hate speech to work the 
aggressor has to have a structure of power behind them that allows them speak with 
such force with authority under social, political, and historical conditions (Taylor, 2012, 
p. 360).              
 Taylor argues that restrictions on hate speech in attempts to curb historical 
injustices are could cause more harm than good, because it keeps in place the 
structural institutions of racism and sexism by creating power struggles from one group 
that has had power historically against a minority class that hasn’t held power 
traditionally.   He points out that an approach to nonideal theory has worked in 
Scandinavian countries, which have been traditionally male dominated.  Now women 
have equal power politically as well as in the home and in some cases are the majority 
bread winners (Taylor, 2012, p. 360).  The structures may have been easier to 
overcome because they were based on sexism and not racism.  Supporters of 
restricting hate speech in the U.S. rely on group-based structural oppressions.   
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 Taylor concludes that regarding hate speech liberal egalitarians have to choose 
between free expression and equal educational and employment opportunities for 
historically-oppressed groups.  He describes how libertarians regard free speech as the 
only place where laissez faire is still applicable.  Liberals defend free speech and free 
association by claiming that redistribution of taxation does not violate autonomy, while 
libertarians are opposed to mandatory taxation for redistributive purposes (Taylor, 2012, 
p. 366).  Laws regarding desegregation of schools and restaurants as well as affirmative 
action in hiring practices have done little to eliminate racism and sexism.  Liberty and 
equality are placed in conflict, but equality takes priority over liberty, why should hate 
speech be treated any differently (Taylor, 2012, p. 366).     
 Taylor states he is on the other side of this debate, although his writing offered 
another point of view he questions that basic liberties should have strong priority over 
socioeconomic equality.  Taylor wants liberal egalitarians to choose between liberty and 
equality regarding controversial issues including hate speech and other issues not 
related to this paper.  He believes when liberal egalitarians finally choose between 
liberty and equality then they would be truly committed to liberalism, or not (Taylor, 
2012, p. 366).           
In conclusion, the racial component of speech in America towards African-
Americans and other historically-oppressed groups by the KKK are similar to the racial 
rhetoric uttered by Nazi’s in Europe.  Burning a cross in an African-American’s yard, is a 
symbolic act of hatred, virulent activity associated with hate speech. Swastikas 
references to the ‘Third Reich’, the Nazi flag, denying the Holocaust and the ‘Heil Hitler’ 
salute are all banned in Europe because of the racial component of that speech.  
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Europeans enacted statutes making it illegal to incite hatred, provoke violence, insult, 
and ridicule, or defame in a manner apt to breach the public peace regarding hate 
speech.   In America, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, Title VI and Title VII   
prohibits a racially hostile education and work environment. In addition, Congress has 
made it a crime to assault or kill a person with a clear racial motivation, perceived 
gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability.  Congress could pass a 
narrowly tailored statute directed at historically inflicted groups protecting them from 
hate speech in public places as the European have.       
 The Supreme Court has ruled that group libel is unprotected speech, because 
language aimed at racial and religious groups could lead to a breach of the peace, thus 
inciting imminent lawless action. “Fighting words” are not protected speech, because 
their very utterance can inflict injury and serves no intellectual purpose to advance 
society, such language does not express any exposition of ideas.  For hate speech to 
be completely banned in the United States the Court would have to overturn R.A.V. and 
Brandenburg.  Holding a Klan rally and advocating political reform through violence 
aimed at racial minorities’ does incite imminent lawless action and would produce such 
an action.  Burning a cross in an African-American family’s yard is something a 
reasonable person of any race would find abhorrent, the act is to intimidate a person or 
group, particularly African-Americans and is in direct correlation with Nazi symbols and 
speech towards Jews in Europe. For these reasons hate speech in America should not 
be protected by the Constitution.   
For equality to flourish us as a nation must continue to work for the protection of 
all citizens regardless of their individual characteristics.  Strive to protect the dignity of 
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all human beings, and to prevent harmful, hateful speech towards one another, while 
protecting the First Amendment for only when we can respect each other with our 
speech only then will speech truly be free.  
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